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Through the afternoon of December 7, 1941, President Franklin 
Roosevelt kept getting more disheartening news about the devasta-
tion wreaked by the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports 
were hard for him to fathom, for he knew that Washington had sent 
repeated alerts to all the Pacific bases—indeed, FDR had personally 
ordered warnings sent on November 27 and 28, which included a 
note that in a confrontation the United States would prefer to have 
the enemy fire first.1 This provision catered to Congressional isola-
tionists, who would support combat only if U.S. forces were under 
attack. Although the president, unlike Secretary of War Henry Stim-
son, was not surprised by the attack, the outcome must have caused 
him grave angst.2
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Japan regarded the successful air strike at Pearl Harbor as justi-
fied retaliation for America’s existential attacks on Japan’s economy 
beginning in July 1941.  Those actions—freezing Japanese assets and 
embargoing the sale of oil to Japan—had been imposed by the United 
States as punishment for Japan’s occupation of southern Indochina as 
a staging area for its campaign to seize oil. The American president, 
on the other hand, had compelling reasons for feeling that, as de 
facto leader of the free world, he had a grave responsibility to oppose 
both Hitler’s Germany and its Tripartite Pact (Axis) partner, Japan, in 
their joint quest for world domination. 
Though the immediate crisis resulted from Japan’s aggression, 
Roosevelt’s overarching concern was Nazi Germany and always had 
been. Hitler at this point not only dominated most of Europe, but also, 
surprisingly, in view of his hatred of communism, had been linked to 
Stalin and the Soviet Union through a non-aggression pact signed in 
August 1939. This Eurasian time bomb had exploded on June 22, 
1941, when Hitler, disregarding his pact with Stalin, mounted a mas-
sive invasion of the Soviet Union, as the president looked on in hor-
ror. His advisers warned him more and more urgently that America 
must not wait longer to join Great Britain in its life-and-death strug-
gle, for the Soviets might soon succumb, and Germany would then 
be able to overwhelm Britain. However, the president’s support in 
the U.S. House of Representatives was paper-thin; on August 12 the 
House had passed by only one vote his indispensable proposal that 
the one-year term of service for draftees be extended.3 
Meanwhile, the North Atlantic sea-lanes had to be kept open 
if Britain was to avoid starvation. After German torpedo attacks on 
the destroyers USS Greer in September and USS Kearny in October 
(in which the Kearny lost 11 of her crew), FDR ordered U.S. Navy 
ships convoying Lend-Lease shipments to Britain to shoot German 
U-boats on sight in American defensive waters west of Iceland. This 
was the context when Robert Wood—chairman of Sears, Roebuck & 
Company, and spokesman for the America First Committee, the lead-
ing isolationist organization in America—urged the president to ask 
Congress to vote “up or down” on the question of going to war. The 
president declined, perhaps sensing that Wood made the proposal 
knowing there were enough isolationist votes in Congress to prevail 
against FDR.
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On October 31 a German submarine torpedoed and sank the 
destroyer USS Reuben James, with the loss of 115 crew members. Roos-
evelt then ordered the arming of U.S. merchantmen; however, he 
continued to decline to call for a congressional vote on the issue of 
war, although in delaying such a vote he was plagued by the nightmare 
that Germany might defeat the British and Soviets before the U.S. 
could join the fight, leaving America, alone in the world, to engage 
the Axis powers.4 
Facing this impasse in the undeclared war with Germany in the 
Atlantic— Hitler was shrewdly refusing to declare war—the president 
turned to the Pacific and Japan. He reasoned that, if Japan initiated 
hostilities by attacking an American asset, the U.S. would be justified 
in retaliating, in which case he was sure Germany would side with its 
Tripartite Pact sworn ally, Japan, and enter the war against America.5 
His problem then became how to inveigle Japan into attacking. 
As early as the first quarter of 1941, feeling his way cautiously, FDR 
arranged to stage the sudden appearance of groups of cruisers at vari-
ous sites in the West Pacific, thus keeping the Japanese off balance 
and harassing them by unexpected confrontations and scrutiny—a 
relatively minor form of provocation. He explained: “I just want to 
keep them popping up here and there and to keep the Japs guess-
ing.” Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), agree-
ing with his revered chief, stated his own position clearly: “. . . there 
was some merit in ships popping up here and there, provided we still 
maintained them in a position where we could concentrate where 
necessary, and not isolate them from the rest of the fleet.”6 
Roosevelt was gravely concerned by the prospect of Japanese forces 
occupying southern Indochina, which would lead immediately to 
the development of airfields and facilities to support an attack on 
the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies in 
Japan’s quest for oil. When Japanese troops occupied southern Indo-
china, FDR responded on July 26 by embargoing trade with Japan—
including the sale of oil—and freezing Japanese assets in the U.S., 
thus  inviting military retaliation, since Japan could not survive as an 
industrial nation without an assured supply of fuel. Roosevelt also sus-
pended the negotiations with Japan, looking toward improved rela-
tions in the Pacific, that had engaged Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
and Japan’s Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura since April. 
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After prompting from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at 
the Atlantic Conference in early August, the president warned Japan 
against intimidating the Soviet Union, which was struggling to fend 
off German armies threatening its major cities. As part of his effort 
to assist the Soviets, FDR agreed to resume discussions with Japan. 
He and Hull met with Nomura again on August 17, after receiving 
assurances that Japan would not resort to the use of force against its 
neighbors.7 
On October 8, in response to Secretary Hull’s request for his opin-
ion on the matter, Admiral Stark argued that America should enter 
the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if doing so meant 
fighting a war with Japan at the same time. Stark added: “. . . the 
sooner we get in the better.” About a week later, mindful of Prime Min-
ister Hideki Tojo’s reputation as a headstrong militarist, Stark warned 
Admiral Husband Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
based at Pearl Harbor, of possible hostile Japanese action; unfortu-
nately, though, he confused Kimmel by downplaying the warning.8 
Fearing reprisals after embargoing the sale of oil to Japan, and 
emboldened by reports of British success in using B17s to bomb Ger-
many, the president, service secretaries, and service chiefs began plan-
ning a surprising new American strategy for the West Pacific. This 
strategy called for establishing a B17 bomber base in the Philippines 
capable of interdicting marine traffic on the South China Sea and 
bombing Japan’s home islands and island bases. British authorities 
happily agreed that B17s scheduled for early delivery to England 
should be delivered instead to Clark Field on Luzon because the 
arrangement entailed a commitment by America to join in opposing 
Japan’s invasion of European colonies in Southeast Asia.
Thus, Clark Field became the base for the Far East Air Force 
(FEAF), under General Lewis Brereton, as a component of General 
Douglas MacArthur’s U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).9 
MacArthur boasted that the “inability of an enemy to launch his air 
attack on these islands is our greatest security.” That circumstance, 
he said, “leaves me with a sense of complete security.”10 MacArthur’s 
boast was based on his—and Washington’s—disastrously mistaken 
belief that Japan lacked fighters capable of escorting bombers from 
Formosa (Taiwan) to Clark Field and back without refueling.
On November 5 CNO Stark and Army Chief of Staff General George 
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Marshall sent the president a memorandum urging him to avoid for 
another three months any action that might provoke a Japanese 
attack. This cushion would supposedly enable America to strengthen 
its defenses and ship more B17s to the Philippines.11  However, even 
while the service chiefs were seeking more time to improve defenses, 
the president was thinking aggressively. Attorney General Francis Bid-
dle noted that, in a Cabinet meeting on November 7, “the President 
was hopeful that an ‘incident’ in the Pacific—not the Atlantic—would 
force the issue of war—‘everyone would think of this as naval warfare, 
excluding the possibility of an (American) expeditionary force.’”12 
On November 15, Hull coolly told Nomura, “If Japan succeeds in 
coming to an agreement with the United States, . . . she would not 
find it necessary to hold onto the tripartite pact,” thereby adding a 
condition that would clearly be unacceptable to Japan.13 Also on this 
day a second Japanese ambassador, Saburo Kurusu, arrived in Wash-
ington to assist Nomura and to help expedite negotiations. That very 
morning General Marshall scheduled a top-secret press conference in 
his office at 10:30, to which the War Department invited seven senior 
correspondents representing Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, the 
New York Herald Tribune, United Press, International News Service, and 
Associated Press. The fullest available account of this extraordinary 
gathering is a memorandum dated November 15, 1941, prepared by 
Time’s Robert Sherrod for his editor, David Hulburd, Jr., and included 
among the Marshall Papers. Marshall himself later reviewed this mem-
orandum, with the guarded observation that Sherrod seems to have 
gotten the gist of the proceedings.14 
According to Sherrod, General Marshall told the correspondents 
that the purpose of the press conference was to inform them about 
the surprising new U.S. strategy regarding Japan and the West Pacific, 
so that in their interpretations of events they would not risk interfer-
ing with this strategy. He then announced that the entire conference 
was off the record and that those who did not agree to keep secret 
what they learned at the conference should leave. No one left! 
Sherrod summarizes the theme of the conference as follows: The 
United States wants “to put up a big front to the Japanese, without 
forcing them into face-saving war measures.” In lurid detail, Mar-
shall pictures American B17 bombers attacking Japan’s civilians and 
destroying its municipal infrastructures (the “big front”): “If war with 
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the Japanese does come,” he warns, “we’ll fight mercilessly. Flying for-
tresses will be dispatched immediately to set the paper cities of Japan 
on fire. There won’t be any hesitation about bombing civilians. . . .” 
Remarkably, Marshall’s “Grand Strategy does not include the use of 
much naval force.” He believes that “U.S. bombers can do the trick 
against Japanese Naval strength and against Japanese cities ‘without 
the use of our shipping.’” Marshall’s point is that America’s new 
Philippine policy means it would be far wiser for Japan to continue 
negotiations rather than to resort to aggression. He also treats a corol-
lary danger: that the withdrawal of U.S. National Guard units might 
lead Japan to attack if Japan thinks those withdrawals mean a reduc-
tion in U.S. defenses. The withdrawals, he says, are really part of an 
enlargement of the Army, with draftees in the Army Reserve replacing 
National Guard units and increasing the size of the Air Corps and the 
Armored Force.
Marshall risked endangering an indispensable source of intelli-
gence when he claimed to the seven newsmen that the United States 
had a secret source—unknown to the Japanese—that revealed how 
little Japan knew of American military developments in the Philip-
pines. There was in fact such a secret source, but that source had 
revealed to American cryptographers that Japanese spies were already 
regularly monitoring U.S. developments at Clark Field in the Phil-
ippines.15 The secret source Marshall would have had in mind was 
“Magic.” U.S. cryptanalysts had broken “Purple,” Japan’s top-secret 
diplomatic code, late in 1940, and “Magic” was the name given to the 
process of decrypting “Purple” and other intercepted Japanese codes 
as well as to the decrypted messages themselves.16 Only the President 
and his War Cabinet—that is, Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and 
Stark, plus their top military aides, and certain communication spe-
cialists and technicians—knew about “Magic,” and they were all sworn 
not even to mention “Magic” except to those with a need to know. 
From Marshall’s hint an alert Japanese official familiar with “Purple” 
could have inferred that America had broken the code, in which case 
Japan would have changed its codes instantly, with disastrous results 
for the United States. 
The purpose of Marshall’s conference, as announced to the assem-
bled newsmen, was to call upon them to keep the information dealt 
with in the press conference secret in order to give Hull time to divulge 
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the new U.S. strategy to the new ambassador, Kurusu. Marshall said 
he hoped that the new ambassador would use this information, kept 
secret by the assembled newsmen, to influence Prime Minister Tojo 
to continue Japanese-American discussions. In fact—notwithstanding 
Marshall’s ostensible purpose in convening the press conference: to 
keep America’s new Philippine policy secret for the time being—a 
series of Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted and decrypted by 
“Magic” had revealed that Japan was already aware of the danger to its 
home islands posed by the B17s in the Philippines.17 
As Marshall (and FDR, of course) very likely intended, the con-
ference was not kept secret for long. At least one participant, prob-
ably Charles Hurd, leaked material to Hurd’s senior colleague at the 
New York Times, Arthur Krock.  On November 19 Krock, a leading 
Washington pundit, published information from the conference. 
Krock reported that, if American commanders decided to defend 
the Philippines by attacking Japan, they had enough large bomb-
ers to bomb Japan, land in Siberia for rearming and refueling, and 
attack again on their return flight to Luzon. This published threat 
of violence involving noncombatants angered and terrified Japa-
nese civilians and challenged Japanese leaders to respond in kind. 
Krock and anyone else involved in the leak could hardly have failed 
to recognize that such threats would be likely to provoke the kind of 
incident President Roosevelt had fancied at his November 7 cabinet 
meeting. 
However, Krock’s understanding of the American Navy’s future 
role in the Pacific differs from Marshall’s as divulged at the “secret” 
press conference. Where Marshall explains how and why the Navy’s 
participation in the forthcoming campaign will be negligible, Krock 
sets the record straight in his corrective by stressing that the new strat-
egy calls for the Navy to play a key role in a Pacific conflict. This fact 
suggests that—with at least tacit presidential approval—he has had 
access to a key naval source, which would most likely be the navy’s 
rising star, Undersecretary James Forrestal, later Navy Secretary, and 
finally Defense Secretary. Forrestal was known for providing leaks on 
occasion to Krock, his longtime close friend.18
Two days after the appearance of Krock’s piece, and just six days 
after Marshall’s press conference, the following article appeared in 
the New York Times: 
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TOKYO, Friday, Nov. 21 (U.P.)—
Newspapers today echoed a warning in the Diet [ Japan’s representa-
tive body] that war in the Pacific would bring bombs crashing into the 
inflammable wooden homes of Japanese cities and towns and urging 
[sic] the people to promote their “fighting spirit.”
Major Gen. Kenryo Sato, director of the War Office Military Affairs 
Bureau, told a [ Japanese] House of Representatives committee yes-
terday that it would be impossible to keep all enemy warplanes from 
Japan. Undoubtedly, he said, the enemy would bomb civilian areas in 
an effort to break the people’s morale.19
This warning in Japanese newspapers concerning the threat posed 
by America’s new strategy was based on discussions the previous day 
in the Diet, and those discussions seem to have made use of Krock’s 
article. Coming from members of the Diet, the warning regarding 
U.S. attacks was aimed at arousing alarm and anger in the populace, 
thus assuring strong support for the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor 
and Clark Field 16 days later. 
In spite of irreconcilable differences between Japan and Amer-
ica, their diplomats continued to negotiate until November 26, and 
then pretended to do so until December 7. These efforts seemed to 
be  succeeding on November 20 when Japan’s proposal suggested a 
prac tical compromise. However, on November 22 the United States 
learned through “Magic” that Japan was extending its deadline for 
completion of any agreement one final time, for four days, to Novem-
ber 29, but that thereafter “things are automatically going to hap-
pen.” Unknown to Washington, of course, Japan’s Pearl Harbor 
Strike Force sortied secretly on November 25, on schedule.20 The 
plan included provisions that enabled Japan to abort the strike any 
time before the final signal triggering the attack. That final signal, 
however, was eventually issued on December 2 ( Japan date): “Climb 
Mount Niitaka, 1208 [‘0000 December 8 ( Japan time)’].”21
On November 25, FDR was confronted by daunting headlines on 
page one of the New York Times: “Nazis Press Air Attacks; GERMANS 
CLOSE IN ON SOVIET CAPITAL.” Fearful that Moscow was about 
to succumb and that the row of dominoes would start to fall, the presi-
dent realized that decisive action was imperative. At the afternoon 
meeting of his War Council he “brought up the event that we were 
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likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japa-
nese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the 
question was what we should do. The question was how we should 
maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allow-
ing too much danger to ourselves.”22 
The next day, November 26, the president aborted a conciliatory 
modus vivendi and directed Hull to present the Ten-Point Note con-
taining demands known to be insulting to Japan.23 He let it seem that 
the decision had been made by Hull, who notified Stimson that the 
situation was no longer an issue of diplomacy but was now a matter 
for which the Army and Navy must take responsibility. The president 
then directed that war warnings be sent to the Pacific bases contain-
ing his note that in a military confrontation the U.S. “desires” that the 
enemy strike first.24 After Hull presented the Ten-Point Note demand-
ing that Japan withdraw its troops from China and Indochina and 
repudiate the Tripartite Pact, the ambassadors, abashed by America’s 
abrupt volte-face, communicated the Ten-Point Note to Tokyo very 
reluctantly. Tojo then ordered them to pretend to continue negotiat-
ing as though nothing had changed.25 
As we have seen, President Roosevelt revealed to his cabinet on 
November 7 his hopes that some incident in the Pacific would enable 
America to enter the war. Over the intervening weeks that idea had 
continued to engross him. He knew from “Magic” that after Novem-
ber 29 “things are automatically going to happen.” On November 30 
the president directed Stark to order Admiral Thomas Hart, Asiatic 
Fleet Commander in Chief, to “cover by air the line Manila Camranh 
Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch.” The 
planes are to observe only and must not “appear to be attacking but 
must defend themselves if attacked.”26 This tentative move, seemingly 
intended to tempt Japan to strike the first blow, was immediately fol-
lowed by a more calculated action.
On December 1, “Magic” offered FDR the reassurance he needed 
for creating a serious incident in the Pacific. In a November 29 dis-
patch to Tokyo, Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima had quoted German 
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop as follows: 
Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States Ger-
many, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no 
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possibility of Germany’s entering into a separate peace with the United 
States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that 
point.27 
Fortified by that reassurance, FDR at midnight December 1 directed 
Stark to order Hart to post three small vessels as a “defensive informa-
tion patrol” in the west China Sea at intervals off the Indochina coast, 
directly in the path of Japanese transports bearing amphibious troops 
to Malaya. Each of these cockleshells was to be armed with at least 
one machine gun and to proceed under the command of a U.S. naval 
officer, with a Filipino crew.28 On December 2 Hart sent this advisory 
to Stark: “When it is considered called for will increase air patrols 
and send out more subs,” indicating that the Asiatic Fleet already 
had ample resources for surveillance and strongly suggesting that the 
defensive information patrol was exclusively a presidential assignment 
intended as bait for a Japanese assault.29 The fact that both General 
MacArthur and General Brereton, commanders in the Philippines, in 
our correspondence with them informed us that they were unaware 
of the defensive information patrol is further evidence that the patrol 
was not stationed for genuine reconnaissance.30
The only small vessel Hart had been able to commandeer for the 
project, the Isabel, reached her station 22 miles from the Indochina 
coast on December 5, was buzzed, and then shadowed all day, by Japa-
nese planes, whose pilots made no move to attack. “In other words,” 
observes Hart’s biographer, “the Japanese had chosen not to sink her; 
there would be no incident.” At that point Hart recalled the Isabel to 
Manila.31 No reports regarding troop ships had been made. A second 
small vessel, the Lanikai, had been commissioned too late to reach her 
station before the attack on Pearl Harbor.32 Thus the President’s gam-
bit never had a chance of fulfilling whatever promise it may have had. 
Meanwhile, a Chicago Tribune reporter, Chesly Manly, somehow 
secured a copy of the top-secret U.S. Joint Army and Navy Board Plan 
—“Rainbow Five”—which entailed war in Europe against Germany 
and Italy. On December 4, 1941, the headlines over Manly’s arti-
cle screamed “FDR’S WAR PLANS!” From the point of view of the 
 America First Committee and other citizens suspicious that a presi-
dent who had promised never to send American troops to fight in a 
foreign war had made unconstitutional commitments to the British, 
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the appearance of Manly’s piece seemed to provide irrefutable evi-
dence that FDR had lied to the people.33 
Three days later, however, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor totally 
eclipsed all other concerns. Concluding that the inquiry he had initi-
ated to determine the source(s) of the leak would be a distraction 
from the war effort, Roosevelt cancelled the inquiry. On 11 Decem-
ber, with Germany’s Declaration of War on the United States, even 
erstwhile isolationists joined in the nationwide chorus that only one 
thing mattered then: “Victory!” 
The capstone event among the president’s entrapment schemes 
occurred around midnight December 6, 1941, the night preceding 
the attack. The president was in the White House, relaxing with Harry 
Hopkins.  Around 9:30 p.m. a Navy courier, Lieutenant Lester Schulz, 
delivered intercepted “Magic” decrypts of the first 13 parts of a Japa-
nese message terminating diplomatic negotiations. A “pilot note” was 
also delivered, indicating that a final part would arrive the following 
morning, December 7, with instructions for delivery of the whole mes-
sage. The message, encrypted in “Purple,” had been sent to Ambassa-
dor Nomura for typing-up and later delivery to Secretary of State Hull 
in accordance with instructions accompanying the final part. 
After the President had read the thirteen parts, he commented, 
“This means war.”34 In doing so, he was, we believe, referring to state-
ments in the message asserting that the latest U.S. proposal “men-
aces the Empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour and 
prestige.”35 Despite recently published opinions to the contrary, it 
seems to us that the president understood at once that such charges 
as these would be made in a formal message addressed from one 
nation to another if—and only if—the offended nation was gearing 
up to attack the offender in defense of its honor and, indeed, its very 
existence.36
This insight (we believe) would have triggered a stunning realiza-
tion on FDR’s part that things were beginning to happen automati-
cally. Could it be that a Japanese strike force somewhere in the Pacific, 
utilizing intelligence provided by Japan’s resident Pearl Harbor spy 
over a period of months, was ready to attack one or more American 
bases in the Pacific, particularly Pearl Harbor?37 Supremely confi-
dent that Pearl Harbor, as well as Clark Field in the Philippines, had 
been fully alerted and was on the lookout, the president now seemed 
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 prepared to stand by as the scenario unfolded and Japan proceeded 
to fire the first shot. 
FDR discussed the intercepted message with Harry Hopkins and 
then immediately phoned Admiral Stark, asking him to call back as 
soon as possible. Returning home from the theatre, Stark called the 
president near midnight on December 6. Since the message implied 
that Japan would attack the United States, perhaps within hours, the 
president, we suggest, would have been eager to get Stark’s advice 
on whether to send a last-minute warning to Pearl Harbor. After our 
June 11, 1961, interview with Admiral Stark in his Washington DC 
home, we ultimately came to the conclusion that he must have recom-
mended that such a warning be sent on Saturday night.38 Since no 
such message was in fact sent, it would seem that FDR decided at the 
last minute to order Stark to withhold any warning. 
Under oath Stark repeatedly maintained that he had no recollec-
tion of what he was doing on the night of December 6, 1941. Steve 
Twomey, in his (generally superior) recent Pearl Harbor narrative, 
strangely enough accepts Stark’s testimony at its face value. Stark’s 
failure of memory, he believes, was genuine, because “Harold Stark 
was too honest, too decent” for it to be otherwise.39 In another excel-
lent recent study, however, Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, in 
their exasperation at Admiral Stark’s stonewalling, complain that, 
“read today, Stark’s testimony seems on its face to be at best vacuous, 
at worst evasive.”40 
With Twomey, we believe that Stark was, by nature, honest and 
decent. With Summers and Swan, however, we find Stark’s testimony 
vacuous and/or evasive. By claiming total amnesia regarding the eve-
ning of December 6, the CNO accepted personal blame for failing to 
send a last-minute warning of an imminent Japanese attack, and thus 
shielded his revered president from an investigation that could have 
ruined FDR’s presidency.41 
One can only imagine how excruciatingly humiliating it must have 
been for Stark to testify over and over that he could not recall the 
substance of his conversation with FDR on the eve of the Pearl Har-
bor debacle, a conversation that, under the circumstances, must have 
been indelibly etched in his consciousness. Admiral Stark’s admira-
tion for the president as the necessary savior of the free world from 
Nazism, however, was unstinting: In a note dated December 12, 1941, 
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Stark urged Roosevelt to be mindful of his health and well-being: “You 
are not only the most important man to the United States today,” he 
says, “but to the world. If anything should happen to you, it would be 
a catastrophe. ”42 
Though we cannot quote the admiral verbatim, we believe this was 
the situation Stark was referring to when, to the best of our recollec-
tion, he said something like this to us during our interview with him 
that day in 1961: “Somebody had to stand up and shoulder the blame. 
It was up to me to do that. I’ll carry that burden, always. I’ll keep that 
secret, always.”43
There is further evidence that a December 6 midnight warning was 
in the works. James Stahlman, a confidant of Navy Secretary Frank 
Knox, intending to help authenticate what really had happened, 
made this declaration: “[Knox] told me that the following had sat 
for a considerable portion of the night of December 6, anticipating a 
Japanese strike somewhere: FDR, Hopkins, Stimson, Marshall, Knox, 
with John McCrea [Stark’s aide] and Frank Beatty [Knox’s aide].” 
George Victor suggests that at this meeting “a decision to warn Kim-
mel was made, Knox [and Beatty] left, and the decision was then 
reconsidered.”44 
It may well be that President Roosevelt cancelled a decision to send 
a last-minute warning during his telephone consultation with Stark, 
and that Knox and Beatty were not notified of the cancellation. This 
development would explain their persistent questions to Kimmel and 
his staff during their investigatory visit to Pearl Harbor on December 
9–14: “Did you get Saturday night the dispatch the navy department 
sent out?” Kimmel and his staff denied receiving such a message. 
Apparently lacking knowledge of any cancellation, Knox insisted, 
“Well, we sent you one.”45 
No doubt Knox divulged this vexing experience to the president 
upon returning from Hawai‘i. FDR must have clued him in at that 
time, for the matter was dropped, and Knox did not mention it in 
his secret report to the president or in their jointly written public 
report. However, in his secret report Knox does mention the errone-
ous statement by General Walter Short, commander of the Army’s 
Hawaiian Department, that a Washington warning “on Saturday night 
at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five 
hours after the attack had been made.”46 That message, arriving hours 
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too late, must have been Marshall’s December 7 warning, which was 
delayed in transmission. 
On that wretched afternoon of December 7, 1941, the president 
was further stunned to learn that the Army’s Hawaiian Department, 
charged with defending the berthed Pacific Fleet and its base, had 
lost most of its interceptor fighter planes before they could become 
airborne. General Short had bunched them together on the ground 
for better protection against sabotage. Thus arrayed, the interceptors 
made ideal targets. Not only Army Air Force planes but also some 
Navy fighters, which came under Army command when the base was 
on alert, were destroyed or seriously damaged.47 Short had taken 
these measures for better protection against the purported threat 
of sabotage by the thousands of people of Japanese descent living 
on O‘ahu.48 Although Short’s preoccupation with sabotage seemed 
to verge on obsession, he was not unique in his concern. As Charles 
Anderson notes, “. . . Short’s awareness of the danger of sabotage in 
Hawaii . . . was shared by virtually every Army and Navy officer of his 
generation.”49 
As early as June 1941 Short had foresightedly conferred with the 
governor of Hawai‘i and the mayor of Honolulu and was granted 
authority to “close or restrict the use of and travel upon any high-
way within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever . . . [Short] 
deems such action necessary in the interests of national defense.”50 
Why Short never exercised his authority to close the roads remains a 
mystery. (It is conceivable that he concluded that such closures would 
simply send a spy to an aerie in one of the surrounding hills.) Kimmel 
too was ever anxious about the complete freedom of access to har-
bor berthing arrangements.51 It seems inexplicable that Short appar-
ently never raised with Kimmel the advantages of closing harbor roads 
or suggested that, since he, Short, had been empowered to regulate 
or halt traffic, Kimmel might be granted similar authority—a clear 
instance of their failure to cooperate proactively. 
Although no sabotage had been attempted, Short’s concern had 
been heightened by three messages that generals in the War Depart-
ment had sent him on November 27 and 28, warning of sabotage.52 
Short, in reporting to Chief of Staff General George Marshall, as he 
had been ordered to do, provided no explanation regarding the defen-
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sive measures he had adopted. His exact words were: “Report depart-
ment alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy. . . . ”53 
In port the battleships of the Pacific Fleet were generally double 
berthed, so that only outboard vessels and single berthed vessels were 
subject to attack by innovative, specially adapted shallow-running tor-
pedoes the Japanese dropped so successfully from slow-flying planes. 
Other battleships and major vessels were subject to armor-piercing 
dive-bombing. Thus most of the fleet’s battleships in Pearl Harbor 
were seriously damaged or sunk, with ghastly loss of life. Admiral 
Chester Nimitz, Kimmel’s successor, later observed, however, that had 
the fleet sortied—as Admiral Kimmel said he would have ordered if 
properly warned—losses would have been even worse, prey to Japa-
nese submarines.54 
As late as December 6 Admiral Kimmel was assuring a newsman 
that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor: “I don’t think they’d 
be such damned fools.”55 Lacking sufficient patrol planes for reliable 
reconnaissance, the confident Kimmel had discontinued the fleet’s 
long-distance patrol flights on November 22 in order to reserve the 
use of his patrol planes for immediate training and later combat. 
Knowing that the Army had search radar high above O‘ahu’s north 
coast capable of detecting approaching aircraft, Kimmel relied on 
Short to provide a warning in what they both regarded as the highly 
unlikely event of a Japanese attack. Unfortunately, the “bogies” 
(unidentified radar echoes) picked up by off-duty radar operators 
practicing on their own shortly after seven a.m. on December 7 were 
dismissed as likely friendly aircraft by the single inexperienced officer 
on duty at the time in the Combat Information Center, and thus were 
not tracked. As a result, Kimmel and Short received no warning, and 
the Japanese raiders approached Pearl Harbor unrecognized.56 
As reports of U.S. deaths and losses in Hawai‘i continued to mount 
late in the afternoon of the seventh, the president, we suggest, at some 
moment experienced a hideous epiphany: that the disaster unfolding 
on O‘ahu was in large part the unintended consequence of his own 
decision to withhold a final warning. For a last-minute alert might, at 
the very least, have shaken up Short and Kimmel, prodded them to 
order general quarters, and inspired Short to ready his fighter planes 
for action. 
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Edward R. Murrow, the nation’s premier radio news commenta-
tor, and his wife had been invited to the White House for dinner that 
evening. Murrow, just returning from London, was to give a private 
briefing for the president after dinner. Once the news of Pearl Harbor 
broke, that briefing was cancelled, but Murrow was invited to meet 
with FDR later that night, and he agreed to do so.57 Roosevelt’s second 
confidant of the evening, William Donovan, recently appointed the 
president’s “Coordinator of Information,” was at a football game in 
New York when his aide, James Roosevelt, the president’s son, called 
Donovan to a telephone shortly after two p.m. and asked him to meet 
with FDR at the White House. Donovan flew at once to Washington 
and later joined Murrow for the meeting with the president.58 
Roosevelt called a War Council meeting for three p.m. At one time 
or another, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, 
Secretary of State Hull, Army Chief of Staff General Marshall, CNO 
Admiral Stark, and FDR’s most trusted adviser, Harry Hopkins, were 
present. In detailed notes Hopkins made before retiring for the night, 
he discusses the meeting: 
The conference met in not too tense an atmosphere because I think 
that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was Hitler and 
that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or 
later we were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an 
opportunity. Everybody, however, agreed on the seriousness of the war 
and that it would be a long, hard struggle. During the conference the 
news kept coming in, indicating more and more damage to the fleet. 
The President handled the calls personally on the telephone with who-
ever was giving the despatches . . . . There was some discussion about 
the President’s message to Congress, for by this time the President had 
decided to go to Congress Monday. The President expressed himself 
very strongly that he was going to submit a precise message and had in 
mind submitting a longer message later. Hull urged very strongly that 
the President review the whole history of the Japanese relations in a 
strong document that might take half an hour to read. The President 
objected. I thought . . . that he proposed now to keep the case centered 
on the attack at Hawaii.59
During the course of the War Council meeting on the afternoon 
of December 7, President Roosevelt received a telephone call from 
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John G. (“Gil”) Winant, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, and British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who were dining together when 
news of the attack reached them. They wanted to express solidarity 
with the president and delight that the attack would dispel the antago-
nism between those endorsing and those opposing Roosevelt’s sup-
port of Great Britain. At the conclusion of the War Council meeting 
at 4:30 p.m., FDR, acting on Hopkins’s advice, scheduled meetings 
with his cabinet and key congressional leaders for that night. Around 
5:00 p.m. he called Grace Tully, his secretary, into the Oval Study and 
began dictation of his short—and “precise”—message to Congress.60 
From 5:30 to 6:40 p.m. Roosevelt rested and was attended by 
his personal physician, Admiral Ross McIntire, an otolaryngologist, 
who treated the president’s inflamed and swollen nasal passages and 
sinuses. The process customarily used by specialists in treating this 
condition involved swabbing the affected tissues with a constricting 
one-percent cocaine solution, followed by flushing with a saline solu-
tion to cleanse and soothe the tissues, making it easier for the patient 
to breathe. It is likely that Admiral McIntire followed these accepted 
procedures on December 7.61 
After supper, FDR and his cabinet convened at 8:40 p.m. and were 
joined by congressional leaders at 9:45.62 The president informed 
the group that late reports indicated that fatalities and losses were 
worse than had at first been believed. A friend and customary sup-
porter, Texas Senator Tom Connally, was outraged by what Roosevelt 
reported. Leaping up, Connally exclaimed, “How did it happen that 
our warships were caught like tame ducks in Pearl Harbor? How did 
they catch us with our pants down? Where were our patrols?” All the 
president could answer was “I don’t know, Tom. I just don’t know.”63 
The member of the Cabinet who had known President Roosevelt 
best—and had worked longest and most closely with him—was Secre-
tary of Labor Frances Perkins.  A sensitive observer, she spoke tellingly 
of the president’s demeanor on the night of December 7: “[T]here 
have been times when I associated that [facial] expression with a kind 
of evasiveness . . . . I had a deep emotional feeling that something was 
wrong, that this situation was not all it appeared to be.”64 Secretary 
Perkins’s observation may be profitably compared with that of the 
president’s wife, Eleanor, who encountered him in his study imme-
diately after he learned of the Pearl Harbor attack. Mrs. Roosevelt 
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noticed that her husband had the same expression of “deadly calm” 
then that she had observed years before when he first learned that 
the diagnosis of his physical disability was poliomyelitis—a steeling of 
himself against travails ahead.65 
After adjourning the meeting with the cabinet and legislative lead-
ers near midnight, FDR invited Donovan and Murrow to join him and 
Harry Hopkins in the Oval Study. According to Murrow, Roosevelt 
was “‘calm and steady,’ though gray-faced.” Over beer and sandwiches 
the president outlined “in detail the losses at Pearl Harbor: the death 
count; ships sunk at the dockside; planes knocked out—‘On the 
ground, by God, on the ground!’”66 
During the 35-minute midnight conference, FDR, according 
to Donovan, “had still not recovered from the shock of the attack. 
‘They caught our ships like lame ducks! Lame ducks, Bill! . . . We 
told them at Pearl Harbor, and everywhere else, to have the lookouts 
manned. But they still took us by surprise . . . .’” Donovan felt that 
Roosevelt found the attack not unwelcome—save for the base being 
caught off guard.67 Luckily for the president, national attention early 
on remained focussed on the failures of Kimmel and Short—not on 
those of Roosevelt, Stark, and Marshall—and on the reconstitution 
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the installation of unity of command, the 
appointment of able leaders to replace Kimmel and Short, and the 
organizing of strike forces led by the carriers USS Lexington, USS 
Enterprise, and USS Saratoga, which, fortunately, had been away during 
the Pearl Harbor attack. 
Earlier in the afternoon FDR had received an encouraging mes-
sage from T. North Whitehead, a British Foreign Office authority. The 
message focussed on a very important point: “The dictator powers 
have presented us with a united America.” “Was it true?” the president 
asked. “Would America now support a declaration of war against the 
Axis powers . . .?” It was a question that had haunted him for months. 
Donovan and Murrow did indeed believe that Congress would now 
support a declaration of war.68
After the midnight meeting, Harry Hopkins, still weak, having been 
released from the hospital only four days before, wanted to chat with 
Murrow briefly before retiring. Hopkins’s assessment of the Japanese 
attack, which he shared with Murrow, is of special interest, since Hop-
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kins was the president’s closest friend and most influential counsellor. 
As they chatted frankly together at the end of a painful day, Hopkins 
assured Murrow that “the Japanese attack was a godsend because it 
meant the country would enter the war united.”69 
Afterwards, Murrow returned to his hotel room and, deeply 
affected by what the president had told him, divulged to his wife that 
the meeting had provided him with the “biggest story of his life,” but 
“he didn’t know if it was his duty to tell it or forget it!” His uncer-
tainty in this regard indicates that the president had not said he was 
speaking off the record, but was relying on the good judgment of 
his visitors. Murrow then decided not to divulge what the President 
had revealed. A few years later, however, when questioned closely by 
John Gunther, Murrow replied that the “story was going to send his 
son through college . . . , ‘and if you think I’m going to give it to you, 
you’re out of your mind’”—thus implying an (unrealized) intention 
to publish the story.70 
Later that night or early next morning, FDR learned that a Japanese 
raid on Clark Field in the Philippines had destroyed, on the ground, 
12 of the 19 B17 bombers stationed there. Somehow, Lieutenant 
Colonel Eugene Eubank, the bomber commander, had not received 
the warnings, supposedly sent to all FEAF units, that Japanese bomb-
ers were approaching Clark Field. At 12:35 p.m. (Philippine time) 
December 8, preoccupied with preparing for an attack on Formosa 
scheduled to take off at 2 p.m., Eubank was briefing his pilots in the 
headquarters building when Japanese planes high overhead dropped 
bombs that soon began exploding just outside—this despite General 
MacArthur’s telephoned assurance to Washington only hours ear-
lier that after Pearl Harbor “our tails are up in the air.” Apparently a 
false alarm involving Japanese bombers attacking Camp John Hay in 
Baguio—which unbeknownst to U.S. observers had returned directly 
to Formosa instead of attacking elsewhere after their raid on John 
Hay—had led the B17s to stay in the air from 8 a.m. till 11 a.m., only 
to be destroyed or disabled on the ground when they all had to land 
to refuel for their (aborted) attack on Formosa.71 General MacArthur, 
who presided over the debacle at Clark Field hours after learning of 
the Pearl Harbor attack, escaped censure, unlike Kimmel and Short, 
and eventually went on to become a revered American hero. 
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During the December 7 midnight meeting, the president, we sug-
gest, told Murrow, Donovan, and Hopkins of the angst that he was 
experiencing and explained that it was caused by the grievous error 
he himself had committed at midnight December 6 in cancelling a 
last-minute warning. He would have felt that he had been in large 
part responsible for allowing the Japanese to attack an undefended 
base, leading to thousands of American deaths. That would indeed 
have been Murrow’s “biggest story of my life.” Whatever it was, he 
never divulged it. Hopkins later told Admiral Stark that FDR meant to 
set the record straight, but he died before doing so.72 Very likely, the 
President hoped that Ed Murrow and Wild Bill Donovan, his two savvy 
and respected confidants, would be able to find a way of justifying his 
decision to withhold a late warning, were such a defense to become 
necessary.
Still, thankful that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor had enabled 
America to enter the war as a united nation, the president could confi-
dently ask Congress to declare that a state of war had existed between 
the United States and the Japanese Empire “since the unprovoked 
and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh.”73 Con-
gress did so on December 8. But only someone ignoring 1) American 
sanctions imposed to cripple Japan’s economy, 2) FDR’s “incidents” 
arranged to bait Japan into striking the first blow, 3) General Mar-
shall’s leaked threats to firebomb Japan’s cities, and 4) what Japan 
perceived as an insult to its honor and a menace to its very existence, 
would venture to describe Japan’s attack as unprovoked. 
Hitler, unaware that Japan was planning to attack Pearl Harbor 
and still hoping to avoid war with America, reneged on Ribbentrop’s 
promise and did not join forces with Japan on December 8, no doubt 
to the surprise of Japan—and Roosevelt! However, in his much antici-
pated December 9 Fireside Chat, an unruffled FDR cannily baited 
Hitler to declare war by charging that “Germany and Italy, regard-
less of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with 
the United States at this moment just as much as they consider them-
selves at war with Britain or Russia.”74 This time FDR’s legendary sense 
of timing did not fail him. Enraged by the Fireside Chat, Hitler did 
finally declare war on America on December 11.75 Thus Murrow and 
Donovan were never called upon to justify FDR’s stratagems. 
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